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Abstract
This paper develops a political economy model that provides an explanation as for
why ruling elites in oligarchic societies may rely on income redistribution to the poor
(the masses) in order to prevent them from attempting a revolution. We refer to this
kind of redistribution as populist redistribution because, ﬁrst it does not increase the
poor’s productive capacity (human capital), and second it seeks to “buy” political
support (peace) to perpetuate the elite’s control of political power. We examine the
conditions under which ruling elites choose to deter the poor (by means of military
repression and/or populist redistribution), to engage in a dispute with the poor for the
control of political power, or, alternatively, to extend democracy. According to the
results of the model populist redistribution (or military repression), if any, increases
with initial wealth inequality and with the amount of redistribution that the poor can
undertake under democracy, and decreases with the relative importance of a human
capital externality in production. The model explains why in some cases the use of
an apparently ineﬃcient policy of populist redistribution turns out to be optimal for
both groups (the ruling elite and the poor class) when the alternative is the use of
military repression or default to conﬂict.
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1“...there was no place on them (the large states) for the smallholder, who now had to
make his way to the city and fend for himself as well as he could, a Roman citizen in name,
but a proletarian in the making. Yet as a citizen he still had a vote. To those with wealth
and political ambition he became someone to buy or to intimidate.”
J.M. Roberts (2004), p. 239.
1. Introduction
Throughout history oligarchic regimes’ elites have relied on diﬀerent methods to try to
perpetuate their control of political power. While in some cases ruling elites have used
only military repression to deter any threat of revolution, in some other cases they have
relied on income transfers to the poor (the “masses”, the “people”) in order to dissuade
them from attempting a regime change. However, ruling elites have not always been able
to completely deter the poor classes from forcing such a regime change, and have had to
engage in a dispute with them, sometimes violent, for the control of political power. Yet, in
some other cases, ruling elites have decided in their own best interest to politically empower
the poor and allow for a peaceful transition to democracy. This paper develops a model
that captures these diﬀerent historical scenarios, explains the choices made by oligarchic
regimes, and provides a framework for understanding the prolongation (through military
repression and/or populist redistribution) of oligarchic regimes, or their eventual fall.
One of the main objectives of this paper is to explain the conditions under which a ruling
elite chooses to engage in populist redistribution as opposed to military repression in order
to deter the masses from attempting a revolution that seeks to change the political regime.
The model also sheds light on the conditions for a peaceful and non-peaceful transition to
democracy. We derive the optimal expenditure done by the elite under each one of these
possible cases (oligarchy with populism and military repression, transition to democracy,
and democracy). A priori, however, it is not clear under what conditions would an oligarchic
regime use military repression, populist redistribution, or a combination of both in order to
maintain political control. Thus, the proposed model explains these diﬀerent means used
by oligarchic elites to maintain political control based on the elite’s incentive to engage
in repression and populist redistribution, vis-à-vis the poor class’ incentive to allocate
resources to challenge the elite’s political control. These incentives, in turn, depend on the
“fundamentals” of the economy: a measure of wealth inequality, the technology parameters
of conﬂict and production, the level of wealth redistribution that the poor can undertake
if the political regime were to be a democracy, and the relative importance of a human
capital externality in production.In addition to this introduction, the paper contains ﬁve sections. Section 2 clariﬁes
some concepts that will be used throughout the paper such as oligarchy, democracy, and
populism; Section 3 contains a short review of the related literature and highlights the
contributions of this paper. Section 4 explains the basic setup of the model, its components,
and the description of the equilibrium. In section 5 we study the main results of the model
and present the comparative statics results. Section 6 concludes.
2. Basic Concepts
The classiﬁcation of political regimes into two major groups, oligarchy and democracy is
useful for the interpretation of the history of political development. In the remainder of the
paper we will use this broad characterization of political regimes and we will distinguish
between oligarchic and democratic regimes based on a real factor, namely, whether the
political (and economic) decisions are controlled by a small minority, the elite, or whether
they are determined by the majority group in the population. Nevertheless, the existence of
an elite is not a suﬃcient condition for a regime to be oligarchic, especially in those societies
that are governed under formally democratic institutions. In other words, a democratic
society is characterized by how diluted across the population the political power is, and not
by the lack of an elite. In fact, democracy was interpreted by Schumpeter ([1942] 1954a)
as the competition in the political arena between diﬀerent elites for the support of a wide
mass of voters.1
One of the most interesting aspects of the analysis of political regimes is their dynamics.
A good portion of political history (at least that of Europe, post-colonial Latin America,
and 20th century Asia and Africa) could be related to the tensions between pro-oligarchic
and pro-democratic forces, with the predominance of the latter in the long run.2 These
tensions, however, have not always resulted in violent struggles.
This paper takes a step forward by providing an explanation of populism. This has been
a recurrent phenomenon in Latin America’s recent political history, and, more importantly,
a crucial component of the explanation as for why some oligarchic regimes have managed
to remain in power during the 20th century in this region.3
1According to McCormick (2001), Machiavelli (in Discourses) was the ﬁrst author to conceive democracy
as a competition between elites for the popular vote (but, also, as a system of additional political controls
imposed on the elites by the wide mass of voters ).
2According to Schumpeter’s interpretation of Plato’s Political Theory (Schumpeter, 1954 a), he con-
sidered the process of economic development (the growth of population, commerce, and wealth) to be
“rebellious”, in the sense of being incompatible with the perpetuation of the ideal (and oligarchic) Repub-
lic. A modern expression of this idea can be found in Roxborough (1984, p. 24).
3The substantive approach to Latin American populism (ﬁscal and monetary expansionary policiesDeﬁning populism has proven to be a diﬃcult task.4 The deﬁnition of populism that
we will use follows the substantive approach (the one favored by economists): the attempt
to gain political support using paternalistic policies, in the form of income redistribution,
that do not increase the workers’ productive capacity nor their level of education. In other
words, populist policies can be seen as the price that ruling elites would have to pay to
buy support and political peace, at least temporarily. As noted in the introduction, we see
populism as an alternative that elites have in order to perpetuate their control of political
power, the other alternative being military repression. If the substantive approach is to
be taken seriously, then economic inequality constitutes a necessary, although not always
suﬃcient, condition for the existence of populism.5
3. Related Literature and Main Contributions
There are two relatively well identiﬁed views in the economic literature on the reasons that
brought about the transition to democracy. While the ﬁrst one stresses the threat of a
revolution by the masses as the driving force behind political reforms and the extension
of the franchise, the second one interprets the transition to democracy as an outcome of a
cooperative process where the economic interests of the elite are not necessarily an obstacle
to the extension of the franchise. In fact, in some of the papers in the literature that
follow the second view, political reforms are promoted by the ruling elite as an optimal
response to changing economic conditions such as rapid urbanization and the increasing
importance of human capital in production during the process of development. As noted
by Lizzeri and Persico (2004) the two views may be complementary to each other and the
forces highlighted by the second view may well coexist with the threat of a revolution. The
key diﬀerence between the two views is that the second one does not rely on the threat of
a revolution to explain the transition to democracy.
According to the ﬁrst view, elites, faced with the threat of a revolution, were forced to
extend the franchise because any promise of future income redistribution would not have
been credible. In other words, the extension of the franchise was the (credible) commit-
beyond limits, as well as wage and price controls, etc., whose main purpose is to redistribute income) was
the focus of Dornbusch and Edwards (1991, ch. 1). See also Kauﬀman and Stallings (1991), who identify
the following political goals of populism: “ (1) mobilizing support within organized labor and lower-middle-
class groups; (2) obtaining complementary backing from domestically oriented business; and (3) politically
isolating the rural oligarchy, foreign enterprises, and large-scale industrial elites.”
4See Di Tella (1965), Roxborough (1984), Dix (1985), Knight (1998), Roberts (2000, p. 14), among
others.
5In fact, “clientelism” has aroused in some countries as a substitute (see the analysis in Robinson and
Verdier, 2003, and Urrutia, 1991).ment device of future income redistribution used by the elites to prevent social unrest (see
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2006). A related explanation is oﬀered by Bourguignon and
Verdier (2000), where the transition from an oligarchic to a democratic regime takes place
because the elite may decide to increase educational expenditure in favor of the poor in
order to avoid the risk of a violent revolution and the property expropriation that comes
with it, and, at the same time, stimulate economic growth via higher rates of human capital
accumulation.6,7
In the second view the transition to democracy arises as a peaceful process promoted
by the ruling elite. For instance, in Galor and Moav (2006) the elite may decide, in
its own interest, to increase the tax rate that they themselves have to pay in order to
ﬁnance public expenditure in education (in favor of the poor) to prevent the return on
capital from declining. Their argument relies on the complementarities between physical
and human capital accumulation in the process of economic development. The increase in
human capital not only favors the workers and the capitalists, but also creates an engine
for sustained economic growth. A complementary explanation for a peaceful extension of
the franchise was proposed by Lizzeri and Persico (2004) in a model based on divisions
within the ruling elite. While some groups within the ruling elite support the provision
of public goods, others favor patronage politics (clientelism), and it is the extension of
democracy what resolves this tension. More precisely, exogenous increases in the value of
public goods provision (i.e. increases in the opportunity cost of redistributive policies),
coming, from instance, from rapid urbanization tilt the balance within the ruling elite
away from special interest politics and towards the increased provision of public goods.
Finally, Gradstein (2007) examines the elite ´ s incentives to extend democracy in a model
that is based on the premise that democracy is an institution conducive to the protection of
property rights. While the elite beneﬁts from the protection of property rights that comes
with democratization because it fosters investment and economic growth, the extension of
democracy implies a redistribution of resources from the elite and toward the poor. The
extension of the franchise in Gradstein’s model is less likely to occur in more unequal
societies because it is in these societies where the redistributive losses suﬀered by the small
elite outweigh the growth enhancing beneﬁts that come with democratization.8
6However, Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) are aware of the possibility that, for the elite, the present
value of the beneﬁts (in terms of the portion of higher income that they are able to capture) of extending
democracy may turn out to be lower than the cost of redistribution that comes with democracy.
7Although Grossman and Kim (2003) is not directly interested in explaining the transition to democracy
it does oﬀer an explanation along the same lines in the sense that educational reforms promoted by the
elite may prevent social unrest.
8The negative relationship between initial inequality and the likelihood of democratization is supportedThe contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it encompasses the two views described
above about the extension of the franchise. More precisely, the extension of the franchise in
the model may come either from the elite ´ s own interest or from a revolution by the masses.
Second, the model provides a rationale for the possible perpetuation of oligarchic regimes.
In other words, the model delivers equilibria under which the elite optimally decides not
to extend the franchise and uses either military repression or income redistribution to the
poor to deter any revolutionary attempt. Whether there is a peaceful or non-peaceful
transition to democracy, or whether the elite decides to deter the masses and keep the
control of political power using income redistribution or military deterrence depends on
the fundamental characteristics of the economy, namely, the degree of wealth inequality,
the extent of redistribution under democracy, the relative importance of a human capital
externality in production, and the relative eﬃciency of the poor in challenging the elite
over the control of political power.
Whether the ﬁrst view is better suited than the second one to explain the transition to
democracy depends on the characteristics (“fundamentals”) of each particular country. By
anchoring four of these “fundamentals” that were described in the previous paragraph this
paper provides a framework for interpreting why some countries had a peaceful transition
to democracy promoted by the elite, others transited to democracy under the threat of (or
an actual) revolution, and other countries remained oligarchic for a long period of time.
The paper is also related to the economic literature that has tried to model the causes of
populism. Campante and Ferreira (2006) develop a model of political competition between
diﬀerent interest groups for the allocation of public funds. In their model, the groups’
relative lobbying eﬀectiveness determines whether the equilibrium is populist (ineﬃciently
pro-poor) or oligarchic (ineﬃciently pro-rich). While in their model populism is a result of
a political process based on lobbying, in this paper we see populism as the price of political
support that a ruling elite pays in order to remain in power.
4. The Model
4.1. The Basic Structure
Assume there is a continuum of individuals of size one. The population is divided into two
groups: a ruling elite, which is a group of size 1−p, and the poor (the “masses”), which is
a group of size p (with p > 1/2). It is assumed that the elite initially holds the control of
political power. One of the choices that the elite can make is whether to extend political
by the evidence in Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2001).power to the poor class or not. If it does, we will call the political system a democracy.
Otherwise, that is, if the elite remains in power, we will refer to it as an oligarchic regime.
4.1.1. Endowments9
Each individual in the economy has a non-negative endowment of wealth. Wealth cannot
be directly consumed, but rather it is used to ﬁnance the accumulation of human capital,
which is the only (individual) input of the consumption good’s production technology. For
the sake of simplicity, we assume that there is no alternative use of wealth.
Given that the total population is assumed to have size one, the total and the average
endowments in the population are equal.
Endowments in the Oligarchic Regime On the one hand, let eo
e > 0 and eo
l > 0 be
the endowments of each agent of the ruling elite and the poor class respectively, when the
political regime is oligarchic (when the elite is in power). We will assume that eo
e > eo
l. In
words, the members of the ruling elite have a higher wealth endowment than the members of
the poor class. The mean endowment in the whole population when the regime is oligarchic,
_
e
o, is then equal to (1 − p)eo
e + peo
l. Let do = eo
e − eo
l, be a measure of inequality in the
distribution of endowments when the regime is oligarchic. Using the last expression, we










Endowments in the Democratic Regime We will assume that in a democratic regime
the majority of the population (the poor class) decides on the amount of wealth redistri-
bution, if any, from the members of the elite to the members of the poor class.10 Let
ed
e > 0 and ed
l > 0 be the endowments of each agent of the ruling elite and the poor class,
respectively, under a democratic regime. That is, ed
e and ed
l are the endowments of each
individual in each one of the groups after the redistribution of endowments that comes with
democracy takes place.
For our purposes, we don’t need to assume anything regarding which group’s endowment
turns out to be larger after the redistribution takes place (that is, whether ed
e ≶ ed
l) .




l (the endowment of the elite in a
democratic regime is smaller than in the oligarchic regime, and the opposite is true for
the poor class). Our corresponding measure of inequality under the democratic regime
9The setup in this subsection closely follows Bourguignon and Verdier (2000).
10The extension of the franchise is likely to induce higher taxation and redistribution as the position of
the decisive voter changes (see Meltzer and Richard, 1981).is: dd = ed
e − ed
l . Given the assumption that the endowment of each agent of the poor
class is larger under democracy and the endowment of the ruling elite is lower, inequality
under democracy is lower than inequality under oligarchy as long as: θ =
￿ ￿dd￿ ￿/do < 1.11
The parameter θ captures the relative level of inequality between the democratic and the
oligarchic regime. The lower is θ, the larger the reduction in inequality in the democratic
regime is, relative to the inequality that prevailed in the oligarchic regime. Furthermore,
the mean endowment in the population under democracy,
_
e
d, is equal to (1 − p)ed
e + ped
l.








d +pθdo, and the endowment of each member of the poor




d − (1 − p)dd =
_
e
d − (1 − p)θdo.
We will assume that the redistribution of endowments that takes place in a democratic
regime does not induce any endowment losses, and as a result the mean endowment in the










4.1.2. Human Capital Formation Technology
As mentioned earlier, agents can only use their wealth endowment to accumulate human
capital, which is itself the only individual factor of production of the consumption good.
Let h(e) = (1 + e)γ , with 0 < γ < 1, be the amount of human capital that an agent with
an endowment e can accumulate.
Using the endowment levels derived in the previous section, we can deduce the amounts
of human capital acquired by the two types of individuals in each one of the two political
regimes. On the one hand, when the elite is in power the average level of human capital in

















e − (1 − p)d
o￿γ , (1)
where the ﬁrst term is the proportion of the population in the elite times the human
capital of each member of the elite, and the second termis the proportion of poor individuals
in the population times their human capital.
On the other hand, in a democratic regime the average human capital in the economy
is given by:
11Presumably, however, it is most likely that the elite’s endowment after redistribution is still larger than
that of the poor class (ed
e > ed
l ), and, as a result dd > 0.
12This assumption is made only for analitical simplicity. However, the setup of the model can easily be
extended to allow for endowment losses of redistribution._
h
d













e − (1 − p)θd
o￿γ . (2)










We will assume that each individual’s income is determined by her own level of human
capital. Also, we will assume the existence of a Lucas-type externality, where individual i’s
human capital is more productive the higher the average human capital in the population















, with 0 < α,η < 1,and α + η ≤ 1, for i = e,l and j = o,d, (3)
where α measures the elasticity of income to individual’s human capital, and η captures
the size of the human capital externality in production.



























Given that θ < 1, the human capital of the elite individuals is lowerunder the democratic
than under the oligarchic regime. However, average human capital in the economy is larger








). As a result, if the
human capital externality is suﬃciently large, and/or the amount of redistribution that can
take place under democracy is suﬃciently small (θ suﬃciently large), the elite individuals’
income may be higher under democracy than under oligarchy. In other words, depending
on θ (which measures how much redistribution can be decided by the poor if the elite
extends political power), γ (which measures the concavity of the human capital formation
13This follows directly from the assumption that γ < 1 and from Jensen’s inequality. Note that if we








would only be the case for a suﬃciently
small γ, and/or a suﬃciently low endowment loss from redistribution.
14See Lucas (1988).technology), and η (the size of the human capital externality), the income of each individual
member of the elite may be larger under democracy than under oligarchy.




































l. In words, poor individuals’ income is
unambiguously larger under democracy than under oligarchy.15
Having determined the main components behind income for each group under each one
of the political regimes we now turn to studying the dispute of political power.
4.2. The Dispute of Political Power
Given the assumption that the elite initially holds the control of political power, at the
beginning of the game the elite chooses whether to extend democracy or not. On the one
hand, if the elite extends the franchise, no resources are allocated by any of the two groups
to the dispute of political power and no populist redistribution takes place. We assume
that the political regime remains democratic thereafter.16 On the other hand, if the elite
decides not to extend democracy, it makes two choices. First, it chooses the amount of
resources to allocate to the dispute with the poor class over the control of political power.
Second, the elite can setup a system of income transfers to the poor class that only takes
place conditionally on the elite remaining in power. That is, we assume that the elite can
commit to redistributing income to the poor class if it were to remain in power.17 By
15Note that if we allow for endowment losses of redistribution it may be the case that the poor class’
income is lower under democracy.
16In other words, we are implicitly assuming that once the franchise is extended, it is prohibitely costly
for one of the groups to exclude the other from the political decision process (Acemoglu and Robinson,
2000).
17A more complete version of the model, in terms of the system of income transfers being reversible once
the elite remains in power, would yield exactly the same results. That version of the model assumes that
if the elite does not make the income transfer (once it remains in power), it would face the threat of a
“counter-attack” by the poor class. Then, in this second stage of the game the elite would face the decision
of whether to fulﬁll the promise by doing the transfer, or to engage in yet another dispute with the poor.
Given that conﬂict is a costly choice, from this second stage an incentive compatibility constraint arises
with regard to the maximum level of income transfer that the elite would fulﬁll. This version of the model
is perhaps too long for an appendix. Nevertheless, it is available from the authors upon request.setting up a system of (irreversible) income transfers, the elite increases the income the
poor class would receive if the elite were to keep the control of political power and, as a
result, it reduces the incentive of the poor class to dispute the elite’s control of political
power. We will refer to this kind of redistribution as “populist” expenditure, in the sense
that this type of transfer does not increase the poor class’ productive capacity (their human
capital in the model), but only decreases the incentive that the poor have to challenge the
elite’s control of political power by increasing the income that the latter group receives
in the oligarchic regime. In other words, by engaging in populist expenditure the elite
is, in some sense, “buying protection” from the poor class. In contrast, in a democratic
regime it is a wealth transfer (not an income transfer) that takes place (which is decided by
the majority of the population - the poor), and, as a result, poor individuals accumulate
more human capital and receive a higher income due to their higher productive capacity.18
The assumption that we make regarding the (one time) wealth transfer that comes with
democracy is consistent with a model where, instead of a wealth transfer from the rich
to the poor that is used by the latter to accumulate human capital, the rich commit to
ﬁnancing public schooling in every period. In other words, given that wealth, which is
by assumption converted into human capital in our model, generates streams of income in
every period, a one time wealth transfer is consistent with an income transfer from the rich
to the poor targeted to the ﬁnancing of public schooling in every future period.
It will be assumed that the elite enjoys a ﬁrst-mover-advantage in the dispute of political
power.19 That is, when deciding the allocation of resources to the dispute of political power
and to populist redistribution, the elite takes into account how these two choices aﬀect the
poor class’ allocation of resources to the dispute of political power. This assumption implies
that under certain circumstances the elite may choose a combination of resources (to defend
its control of political power and a level of populist redistribution) such that the poor class,
optimally, decides not to allocate any resources to disputing the elite’s control of political
power.20 If this is the case, there is complete deterrence, but, a priori we don’t know
18Note that even if populist expenditure were directed towards providing education for the poor, the
assumption that poor individuals accumulate more human capital under democracy than under oligarchy
would still be valid. This is because at least some of the training and education provided by an oligarchic
regime may be political and ideological in nature and may not lead to higher productivity for the poor.
We thank one of the referees for poining this out.
19In other words, we assume that the elite’s expenditure in defense and the setup of a system of income
transfers to the poor represent a commitment on the incumbent’s part: the elite (more formaly, the
Stackelberg leader in the dispute of political power). For a similar treatment of the leader-follower nature
of the contestants in conﬂict situations see Grossman and Kim (1995, 1996a,b) and Gershenson (2002).
20This is a standard feature of leader-follower games in the political economy of conﬂict literature. For
a more detailed explanation of this feature of leader-follower conﬂict games see Gershenson (2002).whether the strategy used by the elite to induce this outcome is based purely on resources
allocated to the dispute of political power (with no populist expenditure), if it is based only
on a high enough level of populist expenditure (with no resources allocated by the elite to
the dispute of political power), or, if the deterrence outcome results from a combination of
positive levels of resources allocated by the elite to defending its control of political power
and to populist expenditure.
However, under other circumstances it may not be optimal for the elite to completely
deter the poor class from challenging its control of political power. In this case, both the
poor class and the ruling elite will allocate resources to conﬂict, and the elite may also, in
principle, choose to engage in populist redistribution to diminish the incentive of the poor
class to challenge its control of political power.
We will assume that in the dispute over the control of political power the elite is suc-
cessful in keeping power with probability q. This probability is determined, on average, by





where ge and gl denote the resources that the ruling elite and the poor classes, respec-
tively, allocate to the dispute of political power.22
The positive parameter φ in equation 8 measures the relative eﬃciency of resources
that the poor class allocates to this dispute. According to equation 8, if both ge and gl are
positive, then the probability of the elite remaining in power is positive but less than one,
and it is an increasing concave function of the ratio ge/φgl.
Figure 1 presents the game tree. The ﬁrst expression in each terminal node is the elite’s
payoﬀ and the second one denotes the poor class’ payoﬀ.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
4.3. Consumption and Optimizing Conditions
As noted earlier, we are assuming that the ruling elite moves ﬁrst, and then, after observing
the elite’s choices, the poor class’ individuals decide on the allocation of resources, if any,
21A contest success function (CSF) is “a technology whereby some or all contenders for resources incur
costs in an attempt to weaken or disable competitors” (Hirshleifer, 1991). In this particular case, the CSF
determines the probability of controlling political power for each player (the elite and the masses) as a
function of the expenses incurred by each of the two players. See Skaperdas (1996) and Hirshleifer (2001)
for a detailed explanation of diﬀerent functional forms of CSFs.
22We do not necessarily need to think of the dispute of political power as a violent struggle. For instance,
the dispute between the two groups can take the form of lobbying (see Campante and Ferreira, 2006).to dispute the elite’s control of political power. We start by solving the problem faced by
the poor class’ individuals.
4.3.1. The poor class
The poor class individuals’ expected consumption is given by:
cl = q(y
o
l + g) + (1 − q)y
d
l − gl, (9)
where g ≥ 0 is the amount of populist redistribution that the elite will make, if any,
conditional on remaining in power.
The poor class chooses gl in order to maximize cl, taking g and ge as given. The ﬁrst
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(10)
Using equation 8 to calculate
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l) is the combination of resources allocated by the elite to the dispute
of political power and to populist redistribution that would dissuade the poor class from
challenging the elite’s control of political power.
4.3.2. The Ruling Elite
Expected consumption of the ruling elite is given by:
ce = q(y
o
e − g) + (1 − q)y
d
e − ge , (12)
The elite chooses ge, and sets up a system of income transfer equal to g (that will
be undertaken only if the elite remains in power) in order to maximize ce subject to the
following constraints:




l ), (13)ge ≥ ε , (14)
g ≥ 0, (15)
where ε is an arbitrarily small number. The ﬁrst constraint (equation 13) says that the
ruling elite will not choose a combination of resources allocated to the dispute of political
power and populist redistribution that is larger than that necessary to deter the poor
class from challenging its control of political power. The second constraint (equation 14)
would only require that ge be greater than zero. However, since the probability of the elite
remaining in power (given by equation 8) is not deﬁned for ge = gl = 0, we will assume
that the elite chooses at least a minimum amount of resources to defend its control of
political power ε > 0.23 The last constraint (equation 15) restricts the amount of populist
redistribution to be non-negative.
Let λ1,λ2,λ3 ≥ 0 be the Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints 13 through
15, respectively.
In making these choices, the elite takes into account not only the direct eﬀect of ge on
q, but also the indirect eﬀect of ge and g on gl (see equation 11).














e − g) − 1 − λ1 + λ2 = 0, (16)









e − g) − q − λ1φ + λ3 = 0. (17)
23This assumption is made only for analytical convenience. An alternative way of getting around this




ge+φgl for gl > 0
1 for gl = 0
.
24It should be noted that the interior solution of the elite’s problem is a saddle (the details are contained
in Appendix 1). This information is used when solving the problem in order to rule out the interior soultion
as one of the possible equilibria.4.4. Equilibrium
The derivation of the equilibriumyields the results summarized in the following propositions
(see Appendix 2 for the full derivations):
Proposition 1 (Democracy): If yo
e < yd
e, the ruling elite extends democracy and the
equilibrium is such that:
i. The poor class chooses gl = 0,
ii. The ruling elite chooses ge = 0, and
iii. The regime remains democratic with probability one.
Proposition 2 (Military deterrence): If yo
e > yd








equilibrium is such that:
i. The poor class chooses gl = 0,
ii. The ruling elite chooses ge = φ(yd
l − yo
l ), and g = 0, and
iii. The regime remains oligarchic with probability one.
Proposition 3 (Populist Deterrence): If yo
e > yd






















− 1 < 0, the equilibrium is such that:
i. The poor class chooses gl = 0,






iii. The regime remains oligarchic with probability one.
Proposition 4 (Dispute of Political Power): If yo
e > yd































− 1 > 0, the equilibrium is
such that:







































Figure 2 summarizes the previous propositions for the case where ε → 0.25
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
25The last part of Appendix 2 deﬁnes and explains the borders of the regions in Figure 2.5. Analysis of the Main Results
This section presents an analysis of the equilibrium of the model and provides the compar-
ative statics results derived from numerical simulations. More precisely, we would like to
know how the equilibrium level of populist redistribution, repression, or the resources allo-
cated to conﬂict change as the parameters of the economy change (initial wealth inequality,
the amount of wealth redistribution that the poor class can implement in a democratic
regime, and the relative importance of the human capital externality in production).
Note from Propositions 1 through 4 that as ε → 0, the resulting equilibrium depends










. Recall that φ measures the relative eﬃciency
of the resources that the poor class allocates to the dispute of political power with the







, can be referred to as the ratio of incentives to dispute
political power. In other words, this term is the elite’s incentive to maintain political
power vis-à-vis the poor’s incentive to challenge it. If this ratio is high enough, it is
relatively cheap for the elite to deter the poor class from attempting a revolution. However,
as explained in the beginning of the paper, it was not a priori clear whether the elite
would use military repression, populist redistribution, or both, to deter any attempt of
revolution. But the results from the model are clear (and simple) in this respect: if the
ratio of incentives to dispute political power is high enough, and the relative eﬃciency
of resources allocated by the poor to challenge the elite’s control of political power, φ, is
greater than one, the elite prefers to use populist redistribution and the minimum level
possible of military expenditure. In other words, if the poor are more eﬃcient than the
elite in the conﬂict over political power and the ratio of incentives to dispute political power
is high enough relative to φ, the elite will use populist redistribution to deter the poor. In
contrast, if φ is smaller than one, and the ratio of incentives to dispute political power is
high enough relative to φ, then it is cheaper for the elite to deter the working class using
military repression, as they would only need to use a fraction φ < 1 of the amount that
they would need to use if they wanted to deter the poor with populist redistribution.
To understand under what circumstances the elite would choose not to deter the poor










creases) the cost of repression becomes higher, and, at some point, the elite ﬁnds it optimal
to engage in a dispute with the poor class over the control of political power rather than
completely repressing a revolution attempt by the latter group. On the one hand, if φ < 1,
military repression is the equilibrium outcome as long as the ratio of incentives to dispute
political control is high enough relative to the poor’s eﬃciency in disputing political power(φ). On the other hand, if φ > 1, using populist redistribution is more advantageous for
the elite than engaging in a dispute with the working class for the control of political power








) (see Figure 2).
Note that, in equilibrium, if the elite deters the poor from attempting a revolution, it
does so using either military repression or populist redistribution, but not both at the same
time. In other words, according to the model, military repression and populist redistribu-
tion are not used at the same time.
5.1. Comparative Static Results
In this subsection we conduct comparative statics of the main results of the model. We are
particularly interested in determining what the model has to say regarding the relationship
between the amount of populist redistribution and: the initial level of wealth inequality, the
amount of redistribution that would take place under democracy, and the relative impor-
tance of the human capital externality in production.26 We will use numerical simulations









l change as the key parameters of the
model change.27 Also, we are interested in understanding how the changes in the parameter
of the model aﬀect the likelihood of a populist (or military) deterrence equilibrium, or the
likelihood of a transition to democracy.
We summarize the main results derived from the numerical simulations in the remainder
of this section.28
1a. Populist redistribution, if any, increases with (initial) wealth inequality.
26Note that the results we will derive in this section regarding how populist redistribution changes with
some key parameters of the model can be directly translated to the case of military repression. Remember
that if populist deterrence is the equilibrium outcome, g (the amount of populist redistribution) is equal
to yd
l − yo
l . In contrast, if military repression is the equilibrium outcome, the amount of resources used to
deter the poor from attempting a revolution is equal to φ(yd
l − yo
l ).
27In the simulations we will assume that η = 1−α (see equation 3). The parameter values that we use in
the baseline simulations are: p = 0.8, α = 0.9, η = 1 −α = 0.1, γ = 0.8,
_
e = 4, do = 10, and θ = 0.9. Note
that
_
e = 4, and do = 10, imply that eo
e = 12.5 and eo
l = 2.5. In words, in the baseline scenario, members of
the elite have ﬁve times as much wealth as members of the poor class. All the results presented in points
1, 2, and 3 are robust to large variations in the parameters of the model.
28Figures summarizing all the comparative statics results described below are available from the authors
upon request.First we ask how populist redistribution (g = yd
l −yo
l ) changes as the measure of wealth
inequality in the oligarchic regime, do, changes.29 Note that by changing do we are inducing
a mean preserving spread in the distribution of wealth in the oligarchic regime (the initial
level of wealth inequality). In other words, as do increases, the measure of wealth inequality
increases, but the mean endowment (wealth) in the population remains constant.
For a given level of θ (a measure of the amount of wealth redistribution that can take
place under democracy), a higher level of inequality in the distribution of wealth increases
the elite’s as well as the poor’s incentive to dispute political power. As a result, an increase
in (initial) wealth inequality increases the amount of populist redistribution necessary for
deterring the poor from attempting a revolution. This is because the optimal level of
populist redistribution (if any) is equal to the poor class’ incentive to challenge the elite’s
control of political power (see Proposition 3, point ii. above). Also, populist redistribution
as a percentage of the income of the poor increases with initial wealth inequality.
1b. The ratio of incentives to dispute political power decreases as wealth inequality
increases. Furthermore, if wealth inequality is high enough, a conﬂict for the control of po-
litical power is the equilibrium outcome (with no populist redistribution) and the probability
that the economy transits to democracy increases with wealth inequality.
As (initial) wealth inequality increases (↑ do), the ratio of incentives to dispute political
power decreases. This happens because, as wealth inequality increases, the incentive for








than the elite’s incentive to defend it (the numerator). This result, in turn, follows from
the assumption that human capital is a strictly concave function of wealth (γ < 1).30
Although the elite’s incentive to persuade the poor class from attempting a regime
change increases as wealth inequality increases, the poor class’ incentive increases faster
and, as a result, populist redistribution becomes more costly for the elite. For a high
enough level of initial wealth inequality, it’s on the elite’s interest not to persuade the poor
from attempting a regime change (using populist redistribution), but rather to engage in a
dispute with them for the control of political power.31
2a. As the amount of redistribution that can be undertaken in a democratic regime
29By doing this we are implicitly assuming that φ > 1 and that we are in the parameter space’s region
where populist deterrence is the equilibrium outcome (see Figure 2). All the results derived in this section
regarding how populist redistribution changes as the fundamental parameters change mirror those that
would result in the case where φ < 1, where military deterrence (repression) is the equilibrium outcome.
30That is, the result follows from Jensen’s inequality.
31This result follows the fact that the ratio of incentives to dispute political power decreases as wealth
inequality increases and from Proposition 4, point iii.increases, so does populist redistribution, if any.
A decrease in θ means that wealth inequality in the democratic regime would be lower
relative to inequality in the oligarchic regime.32
If the economy is in the region of the parameter space where populist redistribution
is the equilibrium outcome, a higher level of redistribution under democracy (lower θ)
increases the poor’s income under this political regime and therefore increases the amount
of populist redistribution (and populist redistribution as a percentage of the poor’s income)
necessary to deter the poor from attempting a regime change. For instance, if there are
institutional rules that limit the amount of redistribution that the poor can undertake in
a democratic regime, or, if the elite can avoid redistribution in democracy by, for instance,
moving their wealth abroad, then the amount of populist redistribution necessary to deter
the poor from attempting a regime change would be lower.
2b. The ratio of incentives to dispute political power increases as the amount of redis-
tribution that can be undertaken in a democratic regime increases. If redistribution under
democracy is low enough, a conﬂict for the control of political power is the equilibrium
outcome (with no populist redistribution) and the probability that the economy transits to
democracy decreases with the amount of wealth redistribution that can be undertaken in a
democratic regime.
A decrease in θ increases the incentive of the poor to dispute political power as well as
the elite’s incentive to defend it. However, the elite’s incentive increases faster than the
poor’s incentive, and, as a result, the ratio of incentives to dispute political power increases.
Although this result seems counter-intuitive at ﬁrst sight (because one would expect that
the poor’s incentive increases faster than the elite’s, given that human capital is a strictly
concave function of wealth), the assumption that p > 1/2 (the poor class is the majority
in the population) means that the eﬀect on wealth of an increase in redistribution under
democracy is larger for the elite than it is for the poor.33
If the parameters of the model are such that the equilibrium is one with conﬂict for the
control of political power (a situation that is more likely when, given other parameters, the
amount of wealth that can be redistributed under democracy is low), the probability that
the economy transits to democracy decreases as the amount of wealth redistribution that
32Recall that the parameter θ =
￿ ￿dd￿ ￿/do < 1 captures how smaller would the measure of inequality be
in a democratic regime relative to that in the status quo (oligarchy).
33Note that a decrease in θ aﬀects only the terms yd
e and yd








note from equations 5 and 7 that a change in θ is multiplied by p(> 1/2) in equation 5 and by 1−p(< 1/2)
in equation 7.can be undertaken under democracy increases.34,35
3a. As the relative importance of the human capital externality in production increases,
populist redistribution, if any, decreases.
An increase in η relative to α means that the human capital externality becomes more
important in determining individual’s income.36 Because the diﬀerence between the poor
class’ human capital and average human capital in the economy is larger under oligarchy
than under democracy, an increase in the relative importance of the human capital external-
ity in production has a larger marginal (increasing) eﬀect on the poor class’ income under
oligarchy than under democracy.37 As a result, populist redistribution, if any, decreases as
the relative importance of the human capital externality in production increases.
3b. The ratio of incentives to dispute political power decreases as the relative impor-
tance of the human capital externality in production increases. Furthermore, if the relative
importance of the human capital externality in production is high enough, a conﬂict for the
control of political power is the equilibrium outcome (with no populist redistribution) and
the probability that the economy transits to democracy increases as the relative importance
of the human capital externality increases.
While the elite’s income in both regimes decreases as the relative importance of the
human capital externality increases, the poor class’ income increases in both regimes. These
results follow from equation 3 by noticing that a higher weight in the determination of
income is put on the average level of human capital in the population (which is lower
than the elite’s human capital, but larger than the poor’s). Furthermore, given that the
diﬀerence between the elite’s human capital and average human capital in the economy
is larger under oligarchy than under democracy, an increase in the relative importance
of the human capital externality has a larger marginal (decreasing) eﬀect on the elite’s
income under oligarchy than under democracy. As a result, the elite’s incentive to defend
its control of political power decreases as the relative importance of the human capital
externality in production increases. Also, as we saw before (result 3a), the poor class’
incentive to challenge the elite’s control of political power also decreases as the relative
importance of the human capital externality in production increases. However, the elite’s
34This result follows from the fact that the ratio of incentives to dispute political power increases with
the amount of wealth redistribution in a democratic regime and from Proposition 4, point iii.
35This prediction accords with the evidence in Lizzeri and Persico (2004) according to which the expansion
of the franchise in Britain was not associated with a large redistribution of resources from the elite to the
masses.
36Recall that for the simulation exercise we are assuming that η = 1 − α.
37In other words, although both yd
l and yo
l increase as η increases, yo
l increases faster than yd
l .incentive to defend its control of political power decreases more rapidly than the poor’s
incentive to challenge it and, as a result, the ratio of incentives to dispute political power
decreases as the importance of the human capital externality in production increases.
When the relative importance of the human capital externality is large enough, the
equilibrium is one with conﬂict for the control of political power, and the probability that
the economy makes a transition to democracy increases as the relative importance of the
human capital externality in production increases.38
6. Concluding Remarks
This paper develops a political economy model that explains the means used by oligarchic
political regimes to perpetuate their control of political power, namely, military repression,
and populist redistribution. The model also accounts for situations where the oligarchic
regime’s elite decides not to deter the poor from attempting a revolution and, as a result,
the two groups engage in a dispute for the control of political power. Yet, the model also
accounts for the possibility of a peaceful transition to democracy that takes place in the
elite’s own interest.
One of the main contributions of our analysis is to provide a rationale for why under
certain circumstances ruling elites in oligarchic societies use populist redistribution rather
than military repression to dissuade a poor class from attempting a revolution that seeks to
change the existing political regime. While populist redistribution works by diminishing the
poor class’ incentive to challenge the elite’s control of political power, military repression
works by increasing the probability that the elite remains in power if a dispute were to take
place. In other words, the model explains why, in some cases, the use of an apparently
ineﬃcient policy of populist redistribution turns out to be optimal for both groups (the
ruling elite and the poor class) when the alternative is the use of military repression or the
default to conﬂict.
Our argument for explaining these four diﬀerent political scenarios (oligarchic regime
with military repression, oligarchic regime with populist redistribution, conﬂict for the
control of political power, and a democratic regime) is based on the elite’s incentive to
defend its control of political power vis-à-vis the poor’s incentives to challenge it, and, on
the relative eﬃciency of the poor in challenging the elite’s power. Furthermore, each group’s
incentive depends on the “fundamentals” of the economy, namely, a measure of (initial)
wealth inequality, the amount of redistribution that the poor (the majority) can undertake
38This result follows from the fact that the ratio of incentives to dispute political power decreases as the
importance of the human capital externality increases and from Proposition 4, point iii.if the regime was a democracy, and the relative importance of a Lucas-type human capital
externality in production.
The model not only provides an explanation for the existence of diﬀerent political
regimes but, also, can shed some light on the understanding of political regime transitions.
In a broad sense, we can conjecture (using the model) that the political history of Latin
America during the 20th century can be divided into four epochs. The ﬁrst being an
epoch where oligarchic regimes used primarily military repression to deter revolutionary
attempts (late 19th century and beginning of the 20th century). This epoch was followed
by one where populist redistribution to the poor was the predominant means used by
oligarchic government’s elites to placate any attempt by the poor to change the political
regime (second quarter of the 20th century and the beginning of the second half of the
20th century). During a third epoch, the second half of the 20th century, Latin America
witnessed disputes -many times violent - between pro-oligarchic and pro-democratic forces
for the control of political power. Only a few countries in Latin America today have
managed to make it into a fourth epoch, that of consolidated democracies.
According to our interpretation, behind the explanation of the transition between these
diﬀerent political regimes in Latin America lies a decrease in economic inequality, an in-
crease in the institutional limitations on the amount of redistribution that can be imple-
mented in a democratic regime, an increase in openness that allows wealth to be transferred
abroad in case of a threat of massive expropriation, an increase in the relative importance
of human capital externalities in the production process, and a better organization and
representation of the working classes in the political arena (an increase in φ, in terms of
our model). While this last paragraph is only a (perhaps valid) conjecture, the understand-
ing of political regime transitions in Latin America and its main determinants doubtlessly
deserves further research.Appendix 1
The Elite’s problem
Using equations 8 and 11 to replace in equation 12, and constraints 13 through 15, the
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d







l − g) − ge
￿
+ λ2(ge − ε) + λ3g
Before continuing with the full set of Kuhn-Tucker conditions (Appendix 2), note the
following:
i. With the assumption that ge > ε, we know that a solution to the elite’s maximization
problem exists (as we have a continuous function deﬁned on a compact set).
ii. The interior solution to the elite’s maximization problem is a saddle point. Using





































































e − g) < 0, and the




l − g) − (yo
e − yd
e − g)
￿2 ≥ 0.Appendix 2
Derivation of the Equilibrium
First, we rewrite the ﬁrst order conditions of the elite’s maximization problem. Using






































for 0 < ge + φg < φ(yd
l − yo
l)




Using equation 8 to calculate
∂q
∂gl



























￿ for 0 < ge + φg < φ(yd
l − yo
l )















￿ for 0 < ge + φg < φ(yd
l − yo
l )




The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
λ1 ≥ 0 ∂L
∂λ1 = φ(yd
l − yo




l − g) − ge
￿
= 0
λ2 ≥ 0 ∂L
∂λ2 = ge − ε ≥ 0 λ2 (ge − ε) = 0
λ3 ≥ 0 ∂L
∂λ3 = g ≥ 0 λ3g = 0
Using the information from Appendix 1, as well as the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, in
principle, there are six possible cases:Case IA Case IB
λ1 = 0, and φ(yd
l − yo
l − g) − ge > 0
λ2 ≥ 0, and ge = ε
λ3 ≥ 0, and g = 0
λ1 = 0, and φ(yd
l − yo
l − g) − ge > 0
λ2 ≥ 0, and ge = ε
λ3 = 0, and g > 0
Case IIA Case IIB
λ1 = 0, and φ(yd
l − yo
l − g) − ge > 0
λ2 = 0, and ge > ε
λ3 ≥ 0, and g = 0
λ1 = 0, and φ(yd
l − yo
l − g) − ge > 0
λ2 = 0, and ge > ε
λ3 = 0, and g > 0
Case IIIA Case IIIB
λ1 ≥ 0, and φ(yd
l − yo
l − g) − ge = 0
λ2 = 0, and ge > ε
λ3 ≥ 0, and g = 0
λ1 ≥ 0, and φ(yd
l − yo
l − g) − ge = 0
λ2 ≥ 0, and ge = ε
λ3 = 0, and g > 0
Analysis of the diﬀerent cases:









































Note that if condition (iaa) holds with equality, cases IA and IIA are equivalent (in
terms of ce). However, if (iaa) holds with strict inequality, the elite’s consumption is larger
under case IIA than under case IA (that is: cIIA
e > cIA
e ).












, with β > 1. Using the last expression, the conditions of



















e. Furthermore, using the level of ge that solves the
ﬁrst order conditions in Case IIA, the conditions of Case IIA, and equations 8 and 11 to






































≤ 2. Furthermore, the level of g that





























, and the level of the level of g that solves equation A2-2 in this









Note that if condition (iba) holds with equality, cases IB and IIB are equivalent (in
terms of ce). However, if (iba) holds with strict inequality, the elite’s consumption is larger
under case IIB than under case IB (that is: cIIB
e > cIB
e ).












, with β > 1. Using the last expression, the level
of g that solves equation A2-2, the conditions of Case IB, and equations 8 and 11 to
replace in equation 12, we have: cIB
e =
β












more, using the levels of ge and g that solve equations A2-1 and A2-2 respectively, the




























≤ 2. We can use the information obtained for each one of these two cases from the
previous points to compare cIIA
e and cIIB
e . Comparing the expressions derived in points 1















So far, point 1 ruled out Case IA, point 2 ruled out Case IB, and point 3 ruled out Case
IIB.








≥ 2φ. Furthermore, note that in this case ge = φ(yd
l − yo
l ). Using this





l).Case IIIB satisﬁes equations A2-1, A2-2, and the conditions λ1,λ2 ≥ 0 for:
φ > 1. Using the conditions of Case IIIB and equations 8 and 11 to replace in equation




l ) − ε(1 − 1
φ).
Note that with ε → 0, cIIIB
e > cIIIA
e when φ > 1.
5. Using the information of point 1 and point 5, in the area of the parameter space
where:







≤ 2, there are two remaining cases: IIA and IIIB. Comparing the







































− 1 ≥ 0. This last expression (when it holds with equality) generates
the function that separates the region of the parameter space where there is an equilibrium
with populist deterrence from that where there is a dispute of political power (see Figure
2).
The Borders of Figure 2
Using the information above, the borders of the regions in Figure 2 are deﬁned as
follows:
For all φ > 0 and yo
e − yd
e < 0 the equilibrium is the extension of democracy in the
elite´s own interest. This happens when the human capital externalities in production are
large enough to counteract the redistributive losses that come with democracy for the elite.
However, when yo
e − yd








≤ 2 and φ ≤ 1, the border separating the region of "Military deterrence"








this expression holds the elite is indiﬀerent between a conﬂict with the masses for the control
of political power and allocating enough resources to military deterrence of revolutionary








≤ 2 and φ > 1, the border separating the region of "Populist deterrence"

















1. If this last expression holds the elite is indiﬀerent between a dispute of political power
and spending enough resources in populist redistribution to the masses to dissuade them







> 2 the border separating the region "Military deterrence" from that of
"Populist deterrence" is deﬁned by φ = 1. In this case, if φ = 1 the elite is just indiﬀerent
between spending military resources enough to defend its control of political power and
redistributing enough income to the poor to dissuade them from attempting a revolution.Bibliography
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